we can say that there are four interacting elements that determine the trajectories of national higher education systems and of individual institutions with some room to manoeuvre within the field: (a) geostrategic position within the changing global environment; (b) national history, regulation, policy, resourcing, and positioning strategies; (c) institutional history and resources; (d) institutional positioning taking.
The changing global environment has become a more important element in the day-to-day life of institutions than it was. Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton (1999) noted that the discussion about globalisation is divided between three main positions. Some argue that global relations and forces are displacing the nationstate. Others argue that globalisation has been vastly exaggerated and little has really changed. A third group argues that although the nation-state continues, it has also been relativised by global flows and convergences, which are transforming human agents and social institutions, whether global, national, or local. This third school of thought best fits the higher education environment; which is both open to global flows and often directly shaped by national government. Higher education institutions were long subject to international influences and, in many nations, were networked to an unusual degree compared to other sectors. In the past two decades the worldwide higher education environment has been transformed by instantaneous communications, ever-expanding people movement, emerging markets in foreign degrees and intellectual property, and the growing cross-border flow of ideas and policy models-not to mention the role of foreign education in the expanding frontiers of national educational participation.
Here practice has run ahead of theorisation and empirical research. Most of the studies of individual national systems, and comparisons between them, are still framed by national rather than global imagining. Such studies tend to underestimate the impact of cross-border flows and the weight of worldwide systems in higher education. The global transformation of subjects is ascribed to national or local factors or is missed altogether. In contrast, another and smaller group of studies is overly focused on the global dimension although treating it as external to the national and local dimensions, a domain of abstract and universal forces pushing in from "outside" (e.g., Currie & Newsome, 1998) . Studies using this approach both overestimate the impact of globalisation and underestimate the manner in which cross-border relations and perspectives work their way inside local identity and dayto-day practice. Other studies have a deeper understanding of global impacts but interpret higher education solely through an Anglo-American cultural lens (e.g., King, 2004) . Arguably, this perspective lacks the critical distance needed to comprehend the global hegemony of Anglo-American higher education itself. Flows between the global and the local/national are two-way, but this very reciprocity is unevenly distributed . Some universities and national systems are not only shaped by global factors, but they also share the shaping of those global factors themselves: Two thirds of the world's top 100 research universities in terms of measured performance are located in the United States and United Kingdom (Shanghai Jiao Tong University Institute of Higher Education [SJTUIHE], 2005) . Not all nations and universities exercise such global influence. Nevertheless, two-way global potential is not confined to U.S. and U.K. universities, especially in the longer term.
The Article
Our understanding of the dynamics of the global higher education environment is advanced by "situated case studies" (Deem, 2001; Sidhu, 2004 ) that examine the transformations talking place in national systems and individual institutions and, in doing so, allow us to focus on the interactions between the global dimension and the national and local dimensions, which are distinct zones of practice that are never finally separated. There are many possible case studies of individual universities, and national systems, in the global setting. Each can tell us something of global dynamics. The article locates the global position and positioning-taking strategies of one national higher education system and of its individual institutions: that of Australia. Between 1990 and 2003, Australia's share of the worldwide population of cross-border students rose from 1% to 9% (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] , 2005, p. 253), a spectacular case of position-taking strategies in global higher education that has intrigued policy makers in other nations. At the same time, there are limits to the geostrategic global location of Australia and its individual universities. These limits are partly a function of Australia's colonial history; partly of its present geography, economics, and cultural configuration; and partly self-imposed by public policy and institutional choice. The future global position and trajectory of Australian higher education is uncertain.
The article is grounded in 2005 when Australian universities 1 were undergoing a major reordering of funding and system boundaries and structure. But rather than looking outward from the reconstruction of the national system to the global setting, a pre-Copernican perspective that would privilege Australia, the article locates Australian education in the global setting before working back to the policy changes in the national system, which, given Australia's weight in cross-border degrees, have global implications as well as local and national ones. The article is interested in the interplays between position and positioning and in the interface between the national and global interplays. Following an overview of the global scene, the article focuses on Australia's role in the commercial market in crossborder degrees, its comparative research performance, the effects of national funding and incentives on Australian global behaviours, and the exchanges between national system stratification and a global stratification in which both institutions and national systems are global players.
THE GLOBAL FIELD OF HIGHER EDUCATION
Every national higher education system is shaped by the dynamics of status competition and system stratification between institutions. In all nations, including those where tuition is free of charge, higher education produces status goods with private value for students/graduates and research, with commercial utility embodying some degree of scarcity. Leading universities draw status both from their research performance and from their power to attract students and staff. Every national system exhibits a common tendency to bifurcate between selective research universities, for whom resources are a means to academic and social status, and mass providers, sometimes commercial, focused primarily on teaching, whose primary concern is to maintain and expand student enrolments and the public or private revenues they bring. In many nations, there is also a third group of institutions between the other two struggling to enter the elite or mixing the heterogenous brands with limited success. This polarisation follows naturally from the collision between selectivity and mass education; in some nations it is much modified by egalitarian policies. Different national systems vary in the extent to which private status goods dominate the sector and are zero-sum in relation to potential public goods; vary in the economic and social value of the private goods; vary in whether scarcity is mediated by tuition charges, academic selection mechanisms, or the administrative allocation of places; and vary in the "steepness" of the national hierarchy-that is, the extent of inequality in status and resources between different institutions. Some systems are relatively flat in nations where all doctoral universities are seen as on par and similarly resourced. In other nations like the United States or Japan, a steep stratification of status and resources is seen as natural, inevitable, and desirable. Stratification is often formalised by an official division of labour between institutional types or by public rankings based on esteem or performance. The sociological dynamics of status competition and positional goods in higher education have been explored elsewhere (e.g., Frank & Cook, 1995; Geiger, 2004; Hirsch, 1976; Marginson, in press-a, in press-b) .
Globalisation has added a new element to national competition and stratification. Although research universities always engaged in cross-border activity at their margin, we can now identify a single system of worldwide higher education for the first time: a network of Web sites joined by instant messaging and data transfer, in which global connections run through the centre of institutions and governments and are integral to day-to-day practices. At the same time, global people mobility has substantially increased. Between 1998 and 2003, the number of cross-border students entering OECD nations rose by 48.9%. In 2003, there were 2.1 million such students in the main exporting nations (OECD, 2005, p. 273) , just more than 1% of all people living outside their country of origin. Of these cross-border students, 46% travel from China, India, and other Asian nations to OECD nations-mostly English-language education systems and mostly to study for globally portable qualifications in business, computing, and intensive English. Later, many will migrate to the nation of education. The second-largest group of crossborder students (29%) is moving within Europe (OECD, 2005, p. 257) .
Global communications and mobility have created conditions for the emergence of a global market in higher education. This is structured in two tiers: a "superleague of global universities," as it was described by The Economist ("The Brains Business," 2005), mostly located in the United States and with a handful in the United Kingdom; and the much larger group of institutions of lesser status in the nations exporting higher education.
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The Two-Tier Global Market
The super-league universities "regard the whole world as their stage" ("The Brains Business," 2005). They have gained unprecedented visibility and immediacy in the global era. Their degrees and research carry exceptional credibility, and the leading group are household names: Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, MIT, Caltech, Columbia, Princeton, Chicago, Yale, and Cornell in the United States and Cambridge and Oxford in the United Kingdom (see Table 1 ). These institutions do not expand to meet potential demand or establish franchises across the world in the manner of capitalist businesses. Maintenance of the value of positional goods depends on their continued scarcity. The super-league universities compete with each other for the best researchers and doctoral students as well as for national and global leadership. They gain prestige from their role as global demand magnets, although this is less important to them than the status they derive at the peak of domestic U.S./U.K. demand, and they benefit from the contributions of bright foreign graduate students to research and teaching. They are now subject to systematic comparisons, of which the most important is the annual SJTUIHE study of research performance.
SJTUIHE has earned the right to mediate the market through its data quality. It eschews subjective ratings, using hard measures of performance including, as prizes, citations and publications. The SJTUIHE top 500 is a proxy mapping of the worldwide field of research universities, although many national universities fall outside the group. The top 20 and top 100 identify the super-league and "wannabes." The United States has 53 of the top 100 research universities, and the United Kingdom has 11. With Canada (4) and Australia (2), the Anglophone bloc constitutes 70% of the leading research universities. Another 35 are in Europe, led by Germany (5), France (4), Sweden (4), and Switzerland (3) . Six are in Asia, and 5 of them in Japan. The University of Tokyo, ranked at 20 in the world, is the highest-ranked university in a non-English-speaking nation.
In 2004, the OECD estimated the total global market in postsecondary education at US$30 billion. Most of it is located in the mass education tier of the market below the super-league. This tier takes in three types of provision. One is the for-profit sector, specialising in vocational programs with no research, led by institutions such as the University of Phoenix, the largest private university in the United States and now spread to Mexico, India, and Western Europe. The for-profit sector is underpinned by American equity trading, a fast-growing source of investment funds. Second is the commercial provision of foreign education by nonprofit institutions, designed to generate surplus revenues. This includes public research universities in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, private colleges and universities in Malaysia, institutions in Singapore and China, and some first-degree and subdegree programs in U.S. 4-year and 2-year institutions. The liberalisation of cross-border trade in services such as education is currently being negotiated within the World Trade Organisation framework (OECD, 2004, pp. 31-37) . Third are those institutions and nations where foreign education is subsidised by governments, foundations, and/or universities and an expansionary capitalist dynamic is absent. This includes Japan, where cross-border enrolments are publicly subsidised to assist the internationalisation of domestic students, and Germany, where many foreign students pay no fees. Unlike the super-league, universities in the second tier are not household names. Here, reputation is formed more in terms of nations rather than individual institutions.
In considering where to study, mobile students' key choice factors are, in order, country (54%), course (18%), institution (17%), and city (10%).…While awareness of quality (or even reputation) of institutions is mostly local (and difficult to compare across countries), international students clearly tend to assimilate institutions with their country and to build their perceptions on the assumption that quality depends on perceived quality of post-secondary education in a given country rather than in a specific institution. This is evident in a study of Chinese students who tend to separate countries (rather than institutions) into reputation "tiers." . . .Countries and institutions that wish to attract international students (rather than just let them in) have to make sure that the reputation of their higher education system is not damaged by the misbehaviour of certain institutions. (OECD, 2004, p. 266) In 2003, the leading exporters were the United States (28% of cross-border tertiary students), the United Kingdom (12%), Germany (11%), 3 France (10%), Australia (9%), and Japan (4%) (see Figure 1 ; OECD, 2005, p. 253). In the 1990s and early 2000s, the mass market grew particularly rapidly in English-language nations. The map of providers is now becoming more diverse, largely through the growth of income-generating English-language programs in non-English-speaking nations such as Malaysia, Singapore, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, and Sweden. There has been a slowing in the growth of movement into the Englishlanguage nations, particularly the United States, whose share of the world market is falling, and where the proportion of foreign students who enrol in globalised disciplines such as business, computing, and intensive English is down. There has been a sharp decline in Muslim student entry into the United States (Institute for International Education [IIE] , 2005) because of both supply and demand factors, although there is growing student mobility from the Middle East to Europe (OECD, 2005, pp. 250-273) . Australian patterns are discussed below.
National and Global Stratification
The super-league university nations, the United States and United Kingdom, are the largest providers in aggregate. Although only a minority of the more than half million foreign students in the United States are enrolled in the super-league research universities, studies of student demand find that the United States as a whole commands higher prestige than other nations (OECD, 2004, p. 173) . Like local students, cross-border students aim for the highest-prestige university within reach (Lee, Maldonado-Maldonado, & Rhoades, in press; James, Baldwin, & McInnis, 1999) . The prestige and the imagined accessibility of American universities flow back into the structuring of domestic stratification everywhere else. Globalisation does not simply add a layer of mobile foreign students to the student populations of the export nations. It repositions the status competition in all nations, with one exception. In the age of the super-league and SJTUIHE research rankings, traditional national leaders such as the University of Buenos Aires and the University of the Philippines have lost some of their old power to generate status: National stratification has been relativised by the new global hierarchy. The exception is the United States itself, where the national hierarchy of institutions is truly the global hierarchy, globalisation has minor local impacts, and American institutions are being strengthened outside the United States both as models and in fact.
In policy circles everywhere, idealised templates of the Ivy League private university and the customer-focused commercial provider have an unprecedented sway. According to the Economist ("The Brains Business," 2005), the lessons of American success are to diversify income sources in quasi-corporate universities, reduce direct government intervention, and foster diversity and competition to produce an institutional hierarchy. Every nation wants to have its own Harvard, although none can replicate the domestic conditions that have made U.S. higher education powerful. (Ironically, if all nations follow American templates, this will strengthen, not weaken, American hegemony.) Global higher education exhibits the same elite/mass binary stratification that is typical of national higher education systems. It is driven by the same logic of scarce positional goods. The difference is that although the top tier of the global hierarchy is understood in terms of individual universities, the mass tier is mostly understood in terms of nations. The mass sector in fact contains a variety of institutions. Some are elite providers at the national level with less global prestige than national prestige; others may be stronger globally than domestically. All sustain their role in the global market because their degrees constitute private value to cross-border graduates in their home nations, the nation of education, and/or the global labour markets. Much depends on the prestige of their nation within the global market. The rank order of exporters can differ between importing nations and is open to fluctuation and shifts.
What is the relationship between national research performance and national standing in the cross-border market in degrees? There is some correspondence between research strength and volume in the cross-border market (see Figure 1) ; but export volume is not a good guide to export prestige. The high-volume nations differ in the selectivity of entry policies and the degree to which they focus on building foreign student volume as a source of export income and university revenues. 4 There is a closer correspondence between national research performance and global standing in one part of the global market: doctoral education. Crossborder doctoral students go mostly to the United States and the United Kingdom as well as to parts of Western Europe where research students constitute a high proportion of foreign enrolments: for example, in 2003, Switzerland (18.4%), Finland (17.8%), and Sweden (12.7%). Among the high-volume exporters, 9.4% of foreign students in the United Kingdom were enrolled in advanced research programs, but it was only 4.7% in Australia and 1.5% in New Zealand (OECD, 2005, p. 272) . The United States has more foreign doctoral students than the rest of the world put together. In 2001, 16.6% of all foreign students in the United States were in advanced research programs. Despite the research strength of Western European nations, the ease of global mobility, visible opportunities, and cross-national disparities in remuneration facilitate a net "brain drain" of students and faculty to the United States. One OECD study notes that 53% of PhD students from the United Kingdom and 48% from Germany who graduated in engineering or sciences in 1996 were still in the United States in 2001 (OECD, 2004, p. 281) .
A Note on Comparative Research Performance
The SJTUIHE comparison favours large nations with more universities, 5 and it is useful to examine the number of research universities relative to national economic capacity in terms of size and wealth intensity. Table 2 measures economic capacity as total GDP multiplied by GDP per head (GDP 2 ÷ population) using World Bank (2005) data. It confirms that the United Kingdom is very strong not only in its number of research universities-11.0% of the top 100 and 8.0% of the top 500-but also relative to its share of global economic capacity at 4.6%. U.K. university research is also strong relative to public spending on tertiary education, which at 0.8% of GDP was below the OECD country mean of 1.1% in 2002 1.1% in (OECD, 2005 . English-language nations are favoured by research performance measures as English is the only global language of research publication. However, although the United States has 53.0% of the world's top 100 research universities, its research infrastructure is not as broadly distributed as might be expected. It has 42.6% of world economic capacity and spends a colossal 2.6% of GDP on tertiary education, including 1.2% in public funding, but has only 33.6% of the top 500. In the United States, the stratifying effects of government research funding are compounded by the stratifying effects of a high-fee status market. Resources, status, and leading faculty are pulled into the top universities at the expense of regional knowledge economies. There is a trade-off between research depth and breadth.
Nations performing better in research than economic capacity suggests, in order, are Israel, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Denmark, Singapore, Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Hungary, and Belgium. Nations performing about on par overall with economic capacity are the United States, Austria, Norway, Chile, France, Hong Kong China, and South Africa. Underperformers include Ireland, Brazil, Japan, India, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Russia, Italy, Korea, Spain, Poland, Greece, China, Argentina, and Mexico. Of the nations that overperform in university research, nearly all have higher education systems largely consisting of public or quasi-public sector institutions, mostly doctoral universities, mostly funded by governments. Superior research performance rests on publicly funded capacity in "blue sky" (basic) research. Nations with a large proportion of teaching-only and/or private institutions underperform. Even the United States follows this pattern at the level of the top 500. Again, this suggests that the global fascination with reforms along American lines is misplaced, at least in relation to research capacity. No doubt, however, some governments would sacrifice research breadth to push more universities into the top 100. This appears to be the thinking in Australia.
AUSTRALIA IN THE GLOBAL SETTING The Market in Degrees
The global role of international education in Australia is expressed in the volume and spread of foreign enrolments, the economic character of the industry, the countries from which foreign students come, and the programs they enter. With 20 million people, Australia is the smallest of the major export nations, and in 2003, its 9% share of the global market in cross-border tertiary study constituted 18.7% 7 Three quarters of the foreign higher education students attend institutions in Australia. The remainder are in distance education or at campuses in importing nations-including Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam, and South Africa-operated either by the Australian institution itself or by a local partner. All foreign students are classified as full feepaying students except for the 0.9% with foreign aid scholarships (Department of Employment, Education, and Training [DEST], 2005). Scholarship support is low compared to other major exporters. In the United States, more than 4 graduate students in 10 receive university or government scholarships (IIE, 2005) .
There is a substantial foreign enrolment in all Australian universities; in 2004, 19 of them enrolled more than 5,000 foreign students. The largest complement was 17,077 at Monash University (DEST, 2005) . To place this in comparative context, in 2003-2004, the largest foreign enrolment in any American doctoral university was 6,647 students at the University of Southern California (IIE, 2005) . Several Australian universities derive more than 20% of income from the market, a high level of dependence (see Table 3 ). Much as in other English-speaking nations, nearly two thirds of the foreign students are enrolled in business studies and computing. Foreign students are concentrated in first degree and master's by coursework programs: as noted, doctoral education plays a lesser role than in the United States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe. Approximately 80% of all foreign students are from East and Southeast Asia. Australia is the world leader in providing foreign education to its proximate region Southeast Asia; it educates more students from Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia than does the United States (with 15 times Australia's population) and also has a role of global significance in China. In 2004, Australia took in 65,000 students from mainland China and Hong Kong combined, compared to the 67,000 enrolled in the United States 2003 States -2004 . The United States has much stronger drawing power than does Australia in Japan and Korea. Australia has a quarter the United States' number of students from India (DEST, 2005; IIE, 2005 ). Australia's standing within Asia varies. Market research indicates that it is often the nation of first choice in Indonesia and has exceptional credibility in Malaysia. It has lower status in Singapore, Korea, and India.
Early returns for Australian higher education in 2005 indicate that commencing foreign students had grown by only 4%, with declines in some institutions including Monash University. As in the U.S. enrolment, trends were uneven by nation of origin. In 2004, the numbers of higher education students entering Australia from Indonesia, Singapore, and Hong Kong each were down 4% to 5% from the 2003 levels. The number of students from Malaysia rose by 6%, and there was a 47% increase from India and 37% from China (DEST, 2005) . Australia was faring better than the United States in maintaining enrolments from Muslim nations, although the decline in students from Indonesia was significant. Some nationals faced greater difficulties in obtaining visas to enter Australia, and there were heightened concerns about security (Deumert, Marginson, Nyland, Ramia, & Sawir, 2005) . Whereas prior to 9/11 and the war in Iraq, Australia was perceived by foreign students as safer than the United States and United Kingdom (Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002) , it was unclear whether this was still the case. Market research also indicated concerns about the quality of Australian universities in relation to research.
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Dynamics of Expansion
In 1985, the national government reinvented international education in Australia as a market of institutions in competition for full fee-paying foreign students. It began to phase out the existing subsidised places scheme, installed full-cost pricing with no ceiling, and lifted all quotas on the number of full fee-paying foreign students. It provided early assistance with marketing in Southeast Asia, and for the first decade, visa policy consistently facilitated market growth. (Subsequent visa policies have been more contradictory in their effects, but the provision of fasttrack migration opportunities for graduates in demand in the skilled labour markets has been an important element in the continued growth of student numbers; see Tremblay, 2005, pp. 210-212) . In establishing a commercial international education industry, the government had several objectives. First, it wanted to improve foreign trade balances following a downturn in the prices of Australia's commodity exports. It saw services as a growing part of world trade through which Australia could exercise a comparative advantage, including educational services, in which Australian universities enjoyed a sound reputation as an established doctoral system organised and funded on British lines. By creating a larger university sector incorporating the former colleges of education in 1987 -1990 (Marginson, 2003 , the government sought to extend this reputation across all higher education institutions. Second, it was hoped the marketing of foreign education would generate income to supplement public university funding-annual revenues of US$200 million were canvassed-and encourage a more outward-looking and entrepreneurial spirit (Marginson & Considine, 2000) . Third, there was global positioning itself. Higher education was expected to facilitate national responses to globalisation and was seen as one key to a deeper engagement in the Asia-Pacific, where much of Australia's future lay. Opening up the universities to foreign trade was part of the twin process of opening up Australia itself to global competition while fashioning its competitiveness (Dawkins, 1987) . By comparison with other nations, the development of international education in Australia had three distinctive and related features. One was that the settings were unambiguously commercial. Subsidy was minimised, and the regulatory conditions facilitated the open-ended expansion of numbers and hence of university revenues. Second, there was a marked growth in business functions and nonacademic student servicing, more so than in academic capacity. Increasingly marketing, recruitment, and nonacademic student servicing became managed by commercial companies associated with the university. In offshore operations involving local partners, the commercial companies often came to shape teaching programs and employ teaching staff. Third, there was an astonishing rate of growth. Between 1990 and 2004, the number of foreign students grew from 25,000 to 228,555. The target of $200 million a year was soon exceeded. In 2002, in all sectors of education, the export industry earned almost US$4 billion in fees and other spending by students (DEST, 2004, p. 31) . In 2003, foreign students provided the universities alone with US$1.3 billion in fee revenues (DEST, 2005) . What powered this growth was the need for revenues.
The keys to the rise and rise of foreign education in Australia are: (a) There was growing demand for cross-border education in the Asia-Pacific, and of the developed English-language higher education systems, Australia was closely located and cheaper than the United States and United Kingdom; (b) deregulation and business techniques provided necessary conditions for growth; and (c) the government used reductions in its own funding to install dependence on market revenues and position university leaders as the drivers of the business model and export objective. By 2002, public funding per student was at half the level of the mid-1980s (Marginson, 2001) . It fell between 1985 and 1990 amid mergers and the expansion of participation and again after budget cuts in 1996. The first phase saw the foundation of commercial marketing. The second saw major growth: From 1996 to 2003, income from foreign students rose from 6.6% to 13.8% of university income (DEST, 2005) . Foreign student fees became the solution to all problems and needs, whether for new staff, buildings, or communications systems. Turning necessity into virtue, universities incorporated internationalisation and cultural diversity into missions and strategic objectives. In changing behaviour, spending cuts can be as potent a policy weapon as newly funded programs.
The government share of total income tumbled from 91% in 1983 to 58% in 1996 and 44% in 2003. All forms of tuition fees and charges reached 34% of university income in (DEST, 2005 . The OECD notes that between 1995 and 2002, Australia was unique in that an increase in private spending on tertiary education of 78% was joined to a reduction in public spending of 8%, not an increase in the latter as in other nations.
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Public investment in [tertiary] education has increased in most of the OECD countries for which 1995 to 2002 data are available, regardless of changes in private spending. In fact many countries with the highest growth in private spending have also shown the highest increase in public funding of education.…Increasing private spending on tertiary education tends to complement, rather than replace, public investment. The main exception to this is Australia, where the shift towards private expenditure at tertiary level has been accompanied by a fall in the level of public expenditure in real terms. (OECD, 2005, p. 193) From 1995 to 2002, the number of tertiary students increased by 31%, public funding per tertiary student dropped by 30%, and total spending on education institutions per tertiary student fell by 7% (OECD, 2005, pp. 175, 187) . The fall in total resources per student coupled with expanding business functions and nonacademic services triggered a decline in the resourcing of teaching and research functions. In the two decades after 1984, the average student-staff ratio in Australian institutions rose from 13 to 20; and the growth of nonacademic staff outstripped that of academic staff, especially in the new universities (DEST, 2005) . Remarkably, in their position-taking strategies, Australian universities became more dependent on their business acumen than their academic capacity. This generalisation is less true of the old and strong research universities and more true of the newer universities, which were often more aggressive in recruiting foreign students; but all institutions have become dependant on the foreign market to fill the revenue gap. There has been less innovation on the curriculum side of international education than might be expected, and it is doubtful whether Australian universities have proven much better than U.K. or U.S. universities in mixing international and domestic students (Deumert et al., 2005) .
In the meantime, Australian higher education has successfully fulfilled the business objectives of institutions and the policy objectives of government. Base level quality is ensured by a national system of quality assurance and periodic audit (Australian Universities Quality Agency; for more information, go to www.auqa.edu.au). The downside is the negative implications of this resource configuration, and these policy and institutional cultures, for the infrastructure enabling teaching and research and hence, for Australia's long-term academic capacity and global competitiveness.
Australia's Comparative Research Performance
Australia's global position in research is not as strong as in commercial teaching. According to the SJTUIHE data, Australia has 14 (2.8%) of the top 500 research universities, exceeding its share of worldwide economic capacity (1.7%). There are established areas of research strength, such as astrophysics, philosophy, and parts of agriculture and the life sciences. Two Australians won the 2005 Nobel Prize for Medicine, Barry Marshall and Robin Warren. The Australian National University (ANU), which specialises in research, is ranked by the SJTUIHE at 56, down from equal 49th in 2003. The ANU has extensive cross-border networks and probably houses more experts on China and Indonesia than any North American university. The University of Melbourne is at 82, the Universities of Sydney and Queensland are in the top 150, and the Universities of New South Wales, Western Australia, Monash, Adelaide, and Macquarie in the top 300. Tasmania, Newcastle, La Trobe, Flinders, and Murdoch are in the top 500 (SJTUIHE, 2005) . No university founded from 1987 to 1990 has built research to the point of entering the world's top 500; and three established as research universities prior to 1987 are outside the top 500.
Australia's problem here is that, in the top 100, it is weaker than the other English-speaking nations and parts of Western Europe, and its comparative performance may have declined (Butler, 2003) . The most obvious comparators are United Kingdom and Canada. In Canada, Toronto (with a SJTUIHE ranking of 24) and British Colombia (at 37) are well ahead of ANU. Australia made a major commitment to basic research infrastructure between the 1960s and 1980s but then focused one-sidedly on commercialisation. Canada continued to invest in basic research infrastructure, including 2,000 publicly funded professorships. Australia doubled its allocation to research project funding in 2001 but not to research infrastructure, which continued to be weakened by the decline in public funding. The United Kingdom has 3 times Australia's GDP but 5 times its funding for research performance and allocates those funds on the basis of research quality. Australian performance measures are primarily quantitative: grant dollars, research student numbers, and the volume of publications. This creates quantity/quality trade-offs such as more publishing but in lesser status journals (Butler, 2003) .
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CHANGES IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM
In the merged Australian university system established from 1987 to 1990, universities shared a common mission but were differentiated in status, resources, and capacities. The polarisation between selective research-intensive institutions and volume-building teaching institutions was modified but not eliminated by policy. The standard template was a large, often multisite university comprehensive in disciplines and professional programs, entrepreneurial, globally engaged, and aspiring to research outputs and reputation (Davis, 2005, p. 1) . Undergraduate tuition took the form of standardised Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) charges paid to the government rather than variable market fees fixed by the universities. All institutions apart from the ANU, regardless of their prestige or role in research, were locked into a volume-building trajectory in the global market to supplement declining public funding. Everywhere business functions and nonacademic servicing became principal avenues for development when academic resources were under severe pressure (Marginson, 2003) . But the new universities were never provided with the "blue sky" research funding of their predecessors, and the pre-1987 stratification of research outputs survived. Under the Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS), institutions received extra funding for research performance. In 2004, 64% of the IGS money went to the universities in the "Group of Eight," or "G8" (ANU, Melbourne, Sydney, Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia, Monash, Adelaide), and 21% to 11 other universities created before 1975 (Tasmania, Macquarie, New England, Newcastle, Wollongong, La Trobe, Deakin, James Cook, Griffith, Flinders, Murdoch), and only 15% to the 20 universities designated after 1985 (DEST, 2004, p. 95) .
The Minister for Education, Science, and Training, Brendan Nelson, has now reset the system (Nelson, 2003) . First, universities can charge undergraduate fees at any level for up to 35% of students in each program. Second, HECS charges are set by the universities themselves within standard maxima, bringing the HECS closer to a variable market fee. Third, students paying tuition fees in both public and private institutions can access low-cost loans (FEE-HELP), repaid on an income contingent basis. As with the HECS, the threshold for income contingent repayment is set at average weekly full-time earnings, minimising the impact of fees on participation. FEE-HELP makes private institutions economically competitive with HECS-charging public universities for the first time. Fourth, emphasising the virtues of mission diversity (Nelson, 2005) , the minister has foreshadowed a loosening of the boundaries of the sector to permit teaching-only universities, including private and foreign institutions. Finally, he has begun the creation of an Australian equivalent of the U.K. Research Assessment Exercise, the Research Quality Framework (RQF), to distribute research funding on the basis of research quality and impact.
Stratification Effects
These changes will lead to the deconstruction of the standard template, based on indigenous norms; a steeper stratification of the Australian institutions, which are now being pulled between the two Americanised global norms of selective research university (though without the philanthropic, alumni, and corporate dollars that support the Ivy League); and expansionary "customer-focused" teaching providers. In the first instance, the two models are being installed in the public sector, but the private sector is also coming into play. Mission specialisation is now officially valued, rather than comprehensive provision, and this provides more opportunities for private sector than public sector institutions; public universities positioned as teachingonly would lose status. Across both sectors, price variation has created conditions for a hierarchy of product value and the vertical segmentation of markets and resources. The G8 universities are clear winners, able to mobilise their research rankings and student selectivity so as to draw a surplus from full-fee places. They will use part of this surplus to compete globally for academic labour, build research infrastructure, and push up the SJTUIHE rankings. The G8 universities will also receive most of the RQF funding, benefiting from two mutually reinforcing processes of stratification: an American high-tuition market and a British policydriven differentiation of research funding based on measured performance. This might allow the G8 to eschew volume building and become more student-selective in both the global and domestic student markets; and to substitute some domestic fee-paying students in place of foreign. However, without more public funding, it is not possible for research-intensive Australian universities other than the ANU to follow the full logic of size reduction, selectivity, and research concentration. A fall in student numbers does not generate a proportional fall in infrastructure costs. The number of domestic HECS places is fixed by the government, and these places are underfunded. It is impossible to become a demand magnet for foreign research students without extensive scholarship funding. And part of the extra private revenues will be lost to prestige-building infrastructure, marketing, enrolment management, and other costs of competition as in the United States (Kirp, 2004) .
Middle-ranking institutions will have little scope for upward mobility. With public funding in decline and minor prospects of surplus from domestic fees, they will be hard pressed to accumulate resources for building research and institutional status. It will be hard to dispense with volume building as the source to additional revenues, but universities that try to combine research intensity with continuous expansion will tend to lose out: Low student-entry levels will be punished in local and global student markets; dividing scarce resources between heterogenous strategies is a recipe for failure at both, and the SJTUIHE indicators have made research performance transparent. There is always scope for imaginative position taking at any level of status and resources, but universities at the bottom of the hierarchy will have a narrower range of options. Many institutions will be more dependent on global market revenues than before; but some prospective students will respond to the more overt stratification of the Australian system, in conjunction with the data from SJTUIHE, by distinguishing research universities from largely teaching institutions. If total foreign student entry levels off, then times will be tough. Some such universities may become locked into a low price bracket servicing low-quality student intakes and/or those on immigration tracks. Certain institutions may create new niche roles for themselves at the price of a painful reduction of infrastructure and personnel.
The Nelson reforms entrench the global research indicators at the centre of system stratification and in the shaping of mission in the top half of the system. This brings Australian higher education closer to the international mainstream, modifying its distinctive reliance on business acumen, although no doubt Australian universities will still be entrepreneurial in temper and the business model more potent than ever in lower-status universities repositioned outside the main research game. The remaking of the Australian system underlines the lure of the super-league and the symbolic power of credible research rankings. The government has found a quick and economical route to stronger research universities. It is doubtful if it is enough-without ANU-style public research funding, it is hard to see any other Australian university entering the SJTUIHE top 50, let alone super-league status-but additional private revenues will create more scope for position taking. However, the concentration of research capacity, status, and freedoms is achieved by reducing the status of the other institutions and locking them into volume building. In most, if not all, cases, this will create firm barriers to a qualitative lift in research capacity. Arguably, the Nelson system buys research depth at the expense of breadth. Although in the context of scarcity, there will always be a trade-off between research depth and breadth, a shift from public funding to market funding sharpens that trade-off, as the United States shows. Australia might gain more universities in the SJTUIHE top 100 but fewer in the top 500. This poses questions about what spread of research universities is optimal for local and national needs and also what configuration of research universities enables optimum global positioning for Australia. Is its position in the cross-border degree market enhanced overall by the strengthening of a small number of research-intensive universities, or is it weakened overall by the narrowing of research capacity and the mixing of national "brands" in the global marketplace?
AUSTRALIA'S GLOBAL POSITION AND POSITION TAKING
Australian higher education is positioned globally by history and geography. The nation has a strong economy that is stronger in commodities and services than manufacturing as well as a stable polity. Its 2004 GDP at US$605.9 billion was 16th in size, and gross national income per capita at $29,200 was in 21st place (World Bank, 2005) .
11 The higher education system is mature with higher-than-average OECD participation rates and doctoral programs in all fields. The British inheritance is both strength and weakness. On one hand, the similarity between Australian universities and modern British universities has ensured the former a sound global reputation. There is some variation of opinion on how good they are; and Australian research has now been positioned in an upper middle position, below the United Kingdom, by the SJTUIHE survey. On the other hand, Australia is a settler state located on the cultural periphery of two larger English-speaking powers, the United Kingdom and the global hegemon United States. Australia has always been partly dependant on the economic and cultural resources of the United Kingdom and United States; and Australian imaginings are too readily colonised by British and American mentalities, inhibiting the range of global position-taking strategies. Yet Australia is also geographically located at the southeastern tip of the Asian continent, close to the emerging university systems of three of the four most populous nations on earth: China, India, and Indonesia. Almost 10% of citizens in the two largest cities, Sydney and Melbourne, are Asian born. This opens a broader prospect.
Australian higher education institutions have made good but not great positiontaking use of their location in Asia. In addition to building student markets, they have become more engaged with Southeast Asian and Chinese universities than British, American, and European institutions. The journey to a more regionally grounded identity has a way to go. Australia's curriculum is little different to that of the United States and United Kingdom, especially in the business and technology programs where most foreign students are enrolled-programs that reflect Anglo-American notions of "global knowledge." No doubt an industry model of foreign education, in the context of income-driven growth, scarce academic resources, and economies of scale, privileges standard products and inhibits deeper curriculum innovation and cultural encounters. But the problem is also general to Australian society. Despite the fact that one in five citizens is born overseas, Australia remains a monoculture that neglects the potential resources provided by its cultural and linguistic diversity (Clyne, 2005) . Australia has sought to differentiate itself from the United States and the United Kingdom, not through the educational and cultural contents of its programs, but on the basis of a cheaper price because of the depreciated Australian dollar; proximity, safety, tolerance, and nonacademic services; climate and other tourist benefits; and generic claims about excellence. Essentially, Australia has promised to supply American education but in a friendlier setting. As a position-taking strategy, it is vulnerable to shifts in prices and changes in perceptions about qualities such as safety and academic standards. Climate and proximity to Asia constitute a firmer comparative advantage. But these factors are of second order importance if foreign students believe that the better product is elsewhere.
In sum, although the Australian export industry has been brilliantly successful in economic terms, its outstanding growth has been exhibited along relatively narrow lines and has yet to be consolidated in a distinctive comparative advantage based on product. Australia has specialised in high-volume, medium-quality, standard-cost degrees in generic Anglo-American applied vocational programs rather than foundational knowledge. The United Kingdom has also adopted a commercial approach to foreign education, but its public/private development is more balanced. Compared to Australia, the United Kingdom seems to be less stymied by trade-offs between research capacity and commercial development and between quantityand quality-driven globalisation. Compared to Australia, American universities sustain stronger basic disciplines. Doctoral programs in the United States and the United Kingdom are more generous and more attractive.
If national identity and material resources are central to the global reputation of individual institutions, then it is unsurprising that government policy and funding play a direct part in shaping global potential. Australia's policy settings have constrained the potential position-taking strategies. Research-intensive universities like Melbourne, Sydney, New South Wales, and Queensland have been forced to exhibit a "Jekyll and Hyde" personality in the global environment. At home, they are selective and focused on research and they engage in global benchmarking and cross-border research collaborations. But they also have another international agenda, identical to that of the 32 lesser Australia universities, which is to build a massive fee-paying enrolment to fill the revenue gap. Compared to academic activities, business methods provide a more limited set of position-taking options. Unfortunately, it has been difficult to synergise the academic capacities of Australian universities with their business strengths. There is limited scope to bring research insights and cultures to bear on improving standardised highvolume course work programs for middle-level students. ANU is the strongest research university but a minor player in fee-based markets. Several universities with very large foreign enrolments have little research infrastructure. Most Australian research collaborations are in North America, United Kingdom, and Europe, whereas the fee-paying students come mostly from Asia. Australia is weak in international doctoral education, where the potential nexus between global research and teaching is maximised. There are few interfaces between scholars of Asian languages and area studies and those teaching large crosscultural classes.
What are the implications of Australian position taking for the shaping of the global field of higher education? Australia provides a regional alternative for Asian students wanting to enter Anglo-American programs; and to the extent that supply fosters demand, it has fed cost-border movement out of Asia. Furthermore, along with the United Kingdom, it has normed a business model of cross-border education driven by revenues and market share. This is a truly momentous development with pros and cons that will not be exhausted here. Briefly, commercial programs have a remarkable capacity to identify and respond to demand and can generate organisational innovations. For example, Australian and U.K. universities are active in "program and institutional mobility" (OECD, 2004, pp. 215-220) in the form of campuses, partnerships, and distance education in importer nations. This enables a closer engagement in local systems that can expand capacity and participation rates in the importing nations and that may lead to bilingual and hybrid curricula and other initiatives. Furthermore, in the commercial model, quality assurance should be able to protect students against bad provision, although it has yet to be applied consistently to offshore programs. On the other hand, when education is produced as a commodity, autonomous professional input is reduced, there is less scope for adapting programs to different sites, harder contents are emptied out (Naidoo & Jamieson, 2005) , and competition generates costly functions decoupled from product improvement. Commercial provision also stratifies educational opportunities in importing nations (OECD, 2004, pp. 241-246) .
How does global stratification affect the hierarchy in Australia and vice versa? As noted, the SJTUIHE rankings have catalysed desires for an Australian presence in the super-league, strengthened research as the differentiating element in Australia, and robbed Australian universities of some authority at home and abroad. The exception is the ANU. Long given lesser status in Australia than Melbourne or Sydney because of its regional location in Canberra and its minor role in competition for school leavers, its academic reputation as a leading research university is now a public fact. This brings its national standing into line with its global standing. The global implications of Australian stratification are harder to read. Although a midstatus American doctoral university can readily accumulate global power, sharks in Australia are merely salmon abroad regardless of the recent policy changes in Australia. Some G8 universities may be en route to a more elevated future, but at this stage there is not enough in the Nelson reforms to decisively change the global weight of research in any one Australian university, or overall. The open declaration of teaching-only institutions and heterogeneity of mission and status will not change the fact that reputation is nationally rather than institutionally defined; but it will stratify demand within that national reputation and probably affect Australia's standing vis-à-vis other nations. Because all Australian universities apart from ANU engage in high-volume commercial programs and only some are intensive research institutions, there is a clear and present danger that in the longer run, Australian universities will become differentiated from other nations, especially the United States and United Kingdom, not on the basis of Australia's research or its strategically advantageous geo-cultural location in Asia but a distinctive commercial orientation to high-volume, middle-level degree programs.
Universities are rarely credited for good teaching on a comparative basis, and in building a positive global reputation it is research outcomes that count. For Australia, the worst case scenario is that it becomes locked into the role of global polytechnic by its fiscal settings and business culture, its position-taking strategy becomes a downward spiral, its strong quantity position in the cross-border market is eroded, and the material resource base of Australian higher education is further eroded with it. The way out is public reinvestment at scale and especially in research infrastructure.
NOTES
9. The United Kingdom and New Zealand also adopted a commercial approach to foreign students and have rapidly increased market revenues, but in both nations public expenditure on education institutions increased in from 1995 to 2002. Public expenditure in 2002 was 72.0% of total expenditure in the United Kingdom, 62.5% in New Zealand, and 48.7% in Australia (OECD, 2005, p. 198) . 10. According to Butler (2003) , between 1988 and 1998, Australia's share of publications in the Science Citation Index increased by 25%, but its share of citations declined from 6th in a ranking of 11 OECD countries in 1988, to 10th place by 1998, and there was a widening gap to 9th place. "Australia's increase in output appears to be at the expense of impact" (Butler, 2003, p. 147) . One reason was that a growing proportion of Australian articles was published in lower status journals. These achieved the same public funding within Australia as high-status journals and were easier to access.
11. World Bank comparison based on purchasing power parity across nations. See note retrieved 6 October, 2005, from http://www.worldbank.org/data/quickreference/quickref.html student security, university community building and networking, and the global strategies of national universities in the Asia-Pacific. He is a board member of Higher Education, Higher Education Quarterly, and Thesis Eleven and contributed to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2004) study on internationalisation and trade in higher education.
